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a Department of Multi-Actor Systems, Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands 
b Socio-Technical Centre, Leeds University Business School, Leeds, United Kingdom 
c Sol Price School of Public Policy, Dornsife Department of Psychology, Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics, and Center for Economic and Social Research, 
University of Southern California, United States 
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A B S T R A C T   
Emergencies such as fires and terrorist attacks pose risks of injuries and fatalities, which can be exacerbated by 
delayed, ill-informed, or unmanaged responses. Effective emergency communication strategies could be used to 
better inform people and reduce these risks. This research analyzes videos of real-world emergencies to: (a) 
identify people’s observed behaviors that increase risk during evacuations, and (b) examine which emergency 
communication strategies might reduce risk behaviors. We analyzed 126 publicly available videos of emergency 
evacuations in different emergencies (e.g., fire, terror attack, evacuation alarm, perceived threat). We found 
evidence of three types of risk behaviors (delayed response, filming, running) and four emergency communi-
cation strategies (evacuation alarm, staff guiding people to exits, general prerecorded message, live announce-
ment). Our analyses suggest that having staff guide people to exits is the most effective strategy for promoting 
faster and more effective responses. However, neither live announcements nor pre-recorded messages were 
associated with delayed responses, while evacuation alarms were associated with more delayed responses than 
other communication strategies. Although people filming the incident was unrelated to staff interactions, it 
occurred more with alarms sounding and prerecorded messages, suggesting that these emergency communica-
tions might not prevent filming. Compared to no communications, all emergency communication strategies 
reduced running during evacuations. We discuss the implications of this research for identifying effective 
emergency communication strategies and reducing risk-increasing evacuation behaviors.   
1. Introduction 
The outcome of an emergency incident is influenced by the nature 
and timing of people’s responses, which may include delaying evacua-
tion, taking the familiar exit, running, and filming, all of which can in-
crease risk and impede safe evacuation (Kobes et al., 2010a; Lovreglio 
et al., 2016; Purser & Bensilum, 2001). Interviews held with crowd 
safety experts from different fields suggest that, among others, the 
following three behaviors were experienced the most: delayed re-
sponses, running, and filming (Van der Wal, 2019). While delayed 
response to alarms or incidents is one of the most researched risk be-
haviors, filming and running can also be dangerous (Kobes et al., 2010b; 
Proulx & Sime, 1991; Shiwakoti et al., 2017; Shiwakoti et al., 2020). A 
‘risk behavior’ is defined as a behavior that exposes someone to risk, 
which may result from people’s risk perceptions (Kinateder et al., 2015). 
Evacuation research has focused mainly on risk behaviors during 
evacuations from fires and terrorism (Fahy & Proulx, 2005; Kobes et al., 
2010a, 2010b; Lovreglio et al., 2019; McConnell et al., 2010), with the 
former causing more fatalities (Ritchie, 2018). Videos of fire and 
terrorism emergencies and eye witness reports have suggested three risk 
behaviors that occur during emergency evacuations (Donald & Canter, 
1992; Galea et al, 2012; Grosshandler et al., 2005; Kobes et al., 2010a; 
McConnell et al., 2010; Proulx & Fahy, 1997). First, people may be slow 
to evacuate (McConnell et al., 2010; Proulx & Fahy, 1997). For example, 
people may take up to 9 min longer to respond to evacuation alarms in 
residential drills than in office drills, which may be explained by alarm 
audibility, occupant training, and the presence of fire wardens (Proulx & 
Fahy, 1997). Second, people have been observed running during 
* Corresponding author at: Delft Universtity of Technology, the Netherlands. 
E-mail address: c.n.vanderwal@tudelft.nl (C.N. van der Wal).  
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Safety Science 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/safety 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2020.105121 
Received 2 April 2020; Received in revised form 30 October 2020; Accepted 7 December 2020   
Safety Science 136 (2021) 105121
2
evacuations, which may increase the number of collisions (Burroughs, & 
Galea, 2015; Galea et al., 2012; Grimm et al., 2014; Grosshandler et al., 
2005; Kobes, et al., 2010b; Makinoshima et al., 2020; McConnell et al., 
2010). Third, filming with smartphones or other cameras during in-
cidents, such as fires and shootings, has also been observed (Antony & 
Thomas, 2010; Aucoin, 2019). Given the prevalence of mobile tech-
nology and social media use, it is likely that this will only increase. 
Risk behaviors typically arise during emergency evacuations due to a 
lack of situational awareness or a lack of guidance – leading to a 
misunderstanding of the severity of the situation (Kobes et al., 2010a, 
Kinateder et al., 2015). People might not realize that there is an emer-
gency when they do not receive or understand evacuation instructions or 
fail to perceive the threat cues (Nilsson & Johansson, 2009; Proulx & 
Fahy, 1997; Shiwakoti, et al., 2018). Socio-cultural differences and 
variations, such as nationality, age, mental abilities, have also been 
observed to influence emergency responses; although most people 
generally respond in a recommended manner (Galea et al., 2011; Grimm 
et al., 2014; Kholshevnikov et al., 2009; Shields et al., 1999). 
1.1. Risk behaviors and their relation to emergency communication. 
1.1.1. Delayed response 
Emergency communications aim to reduce risk by enhancing situa-
tional awareness of the incident and of viable responses, but may vary in 
their effectiveness (Proulx, 1999, Lovreglio et al., 2016). In a seminal 
piece of work, evacuation time at an underground train station during an 
unannounced drill took up to 9 min with an alarm only, but was reduced 
to between 1 and 7 min with the addition of a recorded or live voice 
alarm, staff directions, or visual display information (Proulx & Sime, 
1991). Other studies have shown that pre-recorded or live voice alarms 
produce a quicker response than alarm sounds only (Purser, 2010), and 
that the presence of staff members can have a significant effect on 
improving response time and exit choice (Samochine et al., 2005). 
The first priority of emergency communication is to alert people to 
evacuate, when evacuation is appropriate (Proulx, 1999). In some cases, 
evacuation instructions will also be accompanied by explanations of 
why the evacuation is needed, through a voice alarm or staff present at 
the scene (Gwynne et al., 2009; Proulx & Sime, 1991; Purser, 2010). 
Most existing evidence of evacuee decision making comes from un-
announced drills, and surveys and interviews with eye witnesses of real 
incidents (Grimm et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2015; Kobes et al., 2010a; 
Kuligowski et al., 2013; Lovreglio et al., 2016; Omori et al., 2017; Proulx 
et al., 1995; Schmidt & Galea, 2013). Early research on human behavior 
in response to fires (Tong & Canter, 1985) adopted a now outdated 
‘physical’ and ‘panic’ approach, in which people were viewed as ‘ball 
bearings’ dominated by physical factors and incapable of rationally 
processing information. It is now understood that social and physical 
factors interact, with social interactions influencing evacuation time 
from buildings (Nilsson & Johansson, 2009; van der Wal et al., 2017). 
Delayed responses to an incident can reduce the time available to 
reach safety and reduce options available to those evacuating, due to, for 
example, fire and smoke blocking previously available routes (Aguirre, 
et al., 2011; Fahy & Proulx, 2005; Grosshandler et al., 2005; McConnell 
et al., 2010). Delayed responses to the Station Nightclub fire in Rhode 
Island in 2003 led to 100 fatalities, exacerbated by crowding at the main 
exit (Aguirre, et al., 2011; Grosshandler et al., 2005). Delayed response 
times of up to 11 min in WTC Tower 1 and up to 25 min in WTC Tower 2 
were reported in the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York in 2001, mainly 
due to people not recognizing the risk (Fahy & Proulx, 2005; McConnell 
et al., 2010). Delayed responses also occur when shows or sports events 
continue despite an emergency, or when a fire alarm is misinterpreted as 
a prank or drill (Proulx, 1999). To maximize the likelihood of a quick 
response, people have to be made aware, clearly and unambiguously, 
that action is required (Proulx, 1999). 
Databases of response times from multiple evacuation experiments 
or real incidents indicate delayed responses can vary as a result of the 
notification people receive, with alarms used alone generally eliciting 
slowest responses compared to warnings by staff, voice announcements, 
and visible smoke (Fahy & Proulx, 2001; Lovreglio, et al., 2019). Our 
secondary analysis of Lovreglio et al.’s (2019) review found that, across 
all drills and fire incidents, response times were faster for a prerecorded 
voice message (0.68 min) and voice alarm (0.87 min) than for an alarm 
sound only (1.68 min), though each of these strategies led to faster re-
sponses than no alarm at all (27.97 min). 
Providing information to occupants as early as possible during 
emergencies will inform their understanding of the situation and enable 
them to respond faster (Proulx, 2001). However, Benthorn and Frantzich 
(1999) found that people do not always realize that alarms and pre- 
recorded messages require evacuation. In their field study, partici-
pants in a retail store heard a fire alarm followed by a verbal evacuation 
announcement. The majority interpreted the verbal announcement 
correctly as suggesting a serious problem, a need for evacuation, or fire. 
However, they also mistook the alarm bell for an ordinary unspecified 
warning or problem, with only a minority realizing that there was a fire 
or another situation requiring evacuation (Benthorn & Frantzich, 1999). 
Voice messages and the presence of trained staff who assist those 
evacuating have also been found to improve evacuation time (Samo-
chine et al., 2005; Shields & Boyce, 2000). In an unannounced retail 
store evacuation, customers relied on the staff to quickly guide them to 
the exits (Shields & Boyce, 2000). The presence of trained staff has also 
been effective in multiple residential and office building evacuation 
drills, and helped evacuees to see the need to respond to fire alarms 
(Proulx & Fahy, 1997). Delays tended to be caused by, among other 
things, poor alarm audibility, misinterpretation of the situation, not 
seeing others evacuate, and absence of fire wardens. Furthermore, the 
occupants of the office buildings evacuated faster than those of the 
residential buildings, because they had received fire drill training 
(Proulx & Fahy, 1997). However, because participants were aware that 
an evacuation drill would be performed (at an unspecified time and 
date), results showed that only 20–25% of participants believed it was a 
real fire emergency (Proulx & Fahy, 1997). 
1.1.2. Running 
Running can lead to falls and increased obstructions and collisions, 
resulting in injuries (Harding, et al., 2010; van der Wal, et al., 2017). 
Running during evacuations has been observed in different emergencies 
and field studies, including hotel evacuations, subway stations, primary 
schools, or other buildings (Hamilton et al., 2017; Kobes et al., 2010b; 
Sørensen & Dederichs, 2015; Yoon et al., 2013). Running has also been 
observed in terrorist attacks or active shooter scenarios (Anderson et al., 
2007; Iqbal, 2015). People may start running when they observe staff or 
security personnel running (Proulx, 1999; Sandberg, 1997). Rapid 
evacuation can produce injuries in addition to those produced by the 
original incident itself (van der Wal, 2019). However, we could not find 
literature on the effects of emergency communication on running. 
1.1.3. Filming 
People might record emergency conditions in an attempt to docu-
ment important events (e.g. as a ’public eye’) or to simply store material 
for their records (e.g. as a ’disaster tourist’) ‘public eye’ to irresponsible 
‘disaster tourist’ (Allan & Peters, 2015). Digital journalism or ‘smart-
phone bystanders’ is a relatively new phenomenon enabled by ubiqui-
tous mobile technology (Allan & Peters, 2015; Andersson & Sundin, 
2016). We found no specific existing literature on people filming during 
evacuations. However, videos of emergency evacuations are widely 
available, providing a useful data source for investigating risk behaviors 
during videos of actual emergency incidents (Van der Wal, 2020). 
1.2. Current study 
In this study, we focus on publically-available videos of ongoing 
emergency evacuations—situations in which people are or should be 
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evacuating immediately—involving the following incidents: fire, 
terrorist attack, shooting, tornado, hurricane, storm, crowd congestion 
at an event, sinking ship, crowd scare, and general alarm sounding. We 
examined videos that were collected online, from YouTube and news 
sites, including smartphone videos from the general public, CCTV 
footage, or live TV. The benefit of using videos is that there is no reliance 
on potentially distorted memories or self-reports. These methodological 
advances increase the accuracy and realism with which emergency be-
haviors can be examined. 
We examine three risk behaviors (delayed response, filming, running), 
four emergency communications (alarm sounding, general prerecorded 
message, staff guiding people to exits, live message), and one contextual 
variable (perceivable threat) in these videos of real-world incidents, as 
these were observable and discussed in the research literature. Our 
specific research questions are as follows:  
1. How frequent are risk behaviors in the evacuation incidents captured 
in our video samples (i.e., delayed response, filming, running)?  
2. How frequent are emergency communications in our video samples 
(i.e., evacuation alarm, general prerecorded message, staff guiding 
people to exits, or live announcement)?  
3. How do these emergency communications relate to these risk 
behaviors? 
2. Method 
2.1. Data collection 
We collected 126 publicly available videos, by searching for emer-
gency evacuations in the Disasters Database (Still, 2020) and on You-
Tube. Our inclusion criteria focused on selecting videos in which: (1) 
people were visibly evacuating, or (2) people should be evacuating, as 
there was an indication of an emergency, such as the alarm sounding or a 
visible threat such as a fire. We excluded videos where no evacuating 
people were visible, including aftermath images or news items, ‘mosh 
pits’ at music gigs, crowd collapses, simulation videos, and crowd surges 
into shops or malls, instructional videos on how to evacuate, videos 
showing drills, staged evacuations, and news videos with no evacuation 
footage from the actual event. Overall, we included 80 videos from the 
Disasters Database based on these inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
We searched YouTube between 1–10 March 2018 and 1–10 October 
2018, using the search terms ‘evacuation’, ‘fire evacuation’, ‘crowd 
disaster’, ‘terror attack’, and ‘immediate evacuation’. We viewed the 
first 50 videos returned for each search term. Additionally, we used a 
snowball sampling approach where we also reviewed the first 20 videos 
that YouTube indicated as related recommendations. We continued this 
process for 120 h until no new videos were found, resulting in a set of 85 
videos from YouTube. 
This search resulted in 165 videos, comprising 80 from the Disasters 
Database and 85 from YouTube. Next, we screened these videos to 
remove any duplicates, including videos of the same incident—which 
were only included if the people and location in the recording were 
different. The final sample included 126 videos, including 54 from the 
Disasters Database and 72 from YouTube, representing 107 different 
incidents. The videos were filmed by the following sources: 83% by 
visitors, evacuees, bystanders, or vloggers, 12% by journalists for TV 
programs, 5% by CCTV or webcam. The videos and their descriptions are 
stored in an online repository (van der Wal, 2020). 
2.2. Coding 
Two independent coders evaluated each video for the presence or 
absence of the following three risk behaviors: (1) Delayed response, (2) 
Focused on filming instead of evacuating, (3) Running; and then for the 
presence or absence of the following four emergency communications: 
(1) Evacuation alarm sounding, (2) General prerecorded message, (3) Staff 
guiding people to exits, (4) Live announcement; and one contextual vari-
able: perceivable threat. 
After training on a randomly selected 20% of the videos, another 
randomly selected subset of 20% of the videos was coded independently 
by both coders. Training was performed via observing the videos 
together and explaining how to code each behavior. The two indepen-
dent coders agreed on 91% of the codes, reflecting strong inter-rater 
reliability (kappa = 0.81), then resolved disagreements through dis-
cussion (McHugh, 2012). The remaining videos were evaluated by one 
coder. 
We tested the relationship between the frequency of each of the four 
emergency communications (our predictor variables) and each of the 
three behavioral responses (our outcome variables) with Chi-square 
statistical tests. In addition, we conducted logistic regressions 
Fig. 1. Distributions of response times to incidents for the majority of people in the emergency videos before commencing evacuation.  
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examining all four emergency communications as predictors of each of 
the three (binary) behavioral response outcomes. 
The coding scheme used the following operational definitions for the 
three behavioral categories and the four communication categories 
below. 
2.2.1. Behavioral categories 
Delayed response. Following previous research, the operationalization 
of delayed response relied on both quantitative assessments of response 
times and qualitative assessments of delaying behaviors (Gwynne and 
Boyce, 2016), as described below. The quantitative assessment was 
based on the number of seconds that elapsed between the first indication 
of the incident and the point at which more than half of the people 
visible in the video had commenced their evacuation. The full distri-
bution of response times across the emergency videos is provided in 
Fig. 1. The quantitative assessment of delayed response was dichoto-
mous, and reflected whether the response time was 30 s or longer (vs. 
not). (see Appendix for analyses). Previous evacuation research has 
indicated that 30 s is a key threshold, as it is close to the modal response 
time in many studies and is sufficiently quick to enable safe evacuations 
generally (Purser & Bensilum, 2001). For evacuation time to be 
measured accurately, the incident had to start during the video, a cri-
terion met by 78 of the 126 videos. However, even when the incident 
was already unfolding at the beginning of the video, the response was 
still categorized as ‘delayed’ if it took 30 s for the evacuation to be 
observed in the video. 
We also incorporated qualitative observations of delayed response. 
These qualitative observations included congestion slowing movement 
towards the exit, someone picking up belongings or waiting for another 
adult before evacuating, or other observable reasons for not taking the 
immediate route to the emergency exit (e.g., asking for information or 
going to find more information without evacuating) (Gwynne and 
Boyce, 2016). 
The gamma correlation between the quantitative and the qualitative 
measure of delayed response was 0.76, p <0.001, suggesting agreement. 
Filming was coded as present (vs. absent) if at least one person was 
focused on filming during the incident. Specifically, we defined “focused 
on filming” as: (1) filming without moving in the evacuation direction 
(e.g., turning the camera round), (2) filming while standing still, or (3) 
talking about what is happening and making efforts to film these fea-
tures while walking. 
Running was coded as present (vs. absent) if at least one person was 
running during the incident. We defined “running” as sustained move-
ment beyond walking speed where both feet leave the ground simulta-
neously during each stride. 
2.2.2. Communication categories and contextual variable 
Evacuation alarm was coded as present (vs. absent) when an alarm 
signal was sounding. 
Staff guidance was coded as present (vs. absent) if staff members were 
giving people verbal or gestural instructions about what to do. General 
prerecorded message was coded as present (vs. absent) when a general 
prerecorded message could be heard. Live announcement was coded as 
present (vs. absent) when a live message could be heard in which a 
member of staff was giving live updates or giving evacuation in-
structions. Live announcements could be distinguished from general 
prerecordings because they tended not to repeat or have pauses. 
Perceivable threat was coded as present (vs. absent) when there was an 
observable cause for alarm, including an observable fire, shooter, 
screaming people, or information from staff about the incident. 
3. Results 
3.1. Research questions 1 and 2: How frequent are emergency 
communications and risk behaviors in evacuations? 
Table 1 shows the frequency of the three risk behaviors, and of the 
four emergency communications, as observed in our videos. Filming 
occurs most often (56%), followed by running (48%), then delayed 
response (35%). Each emergency communication occurs in less than a 
third of incidents: evacuation alarm (33%), staff guidance (32%), gen-
eral pre-recorded message (16%), live announcement (11%). 
3.2. Research question 3: How do emergency communications relate to 
delayed response, filming, and running? 
3.2.1. Delayed response 
The Chi-square tests show that this risk behavior was more likely 
when the evacuation alarm was present and less likely when staff were 
guiding people to exits, but not more or less likely when there was a 
prerecorded or live announcement (Table 2). This risk behavior was less 
likely when a perceivable threat was present (Table 2). The logistic 
regression, which examined the independent relationships of commu-
nication strategies with delayed responses, showed that staff guidance 
significantly decreased the odds of delayed response behavior by 0.33 
(Table 3). The other communication strategies (evacuation alarm, 
Table 1 
Frequency of risk behaviors and emergency communication strategies observed 
in the videos.  
Action Number (%) of 
videos (out of 
126) 
Description  
Filming 70 (56%) A person is focused on filming 
instead of evacuating. 




44 (35%) The majority (>50%) of visible 
people delay moving in the most 
efficient way towards the exit (due 
to congestion, collecting 
belongings, waiting for another 
adult, or a slow response > 30 s). 
Emergency communication 
Evacuation alarm 41 (33%) An alarm (a bell or tone) can be 
heard. 
Staff guidance 40 (32%) Staff are giving people instructions 
about what to do. 
General prerecorded 
message 
20 (16%) A general prerecorded message can 
be heard. 
Live announcement 14 (11%) A live message can be heard in 
which a member of staff is giving 
live information about what is 
happening and/or instructions 
about what to do. 
* Delayed response was analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively (Gwynne 
& Boyce, 2016; Purser & Bensilum, 2001), as described in the Method section 
C.N. van der Wal et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Safety Science 136 (2021) 105121
5
general prerecorded message, live announcement), and the situational 
context (a perceivable threat) did not have independent relationships 
with delayed response, however (Table 3). 
3.2.2. Filming 
The Chi-square tests suggest that filming is significantly increased by 
the evacuation alarm sounding or general prerecorded message, but not 
by the live announcement or staff guidance (Table 2). When examining 
the independent relationships of these communication strategies with 
filming and taking the situational context into account, we found that 
filming was less likely when a perceivable threat was present (Table 2). 
The results of the logistic regression suggest that filming was 3.43 times 
more likely when the alarm sounded, but was not additionally 
associated with the live announcement, general prerecorded message, 
staff guidance, nor perceivable threat (Table 3).1 
3.2.3. Running 
The Chi-square tests suggest that running was less likely with the 
alarm sounding, general prerecorded message, live announcement, or 
staff guidance (Table 2). When examining the independent relationships 
of these communication strategies with filming and taking the situa-
tional context into account, we found that running was substantially 
more likely when there was a perceivable threat (Table 2). The results of 
the logistic regression indicated that running was much less likely (0.17) 
in the presence of an evacuation alarm sounding, but more likely when 
there is a perceivable threat (6.30) (Table 3). 
4. Discussion 
Emergency communication strategies aim to reduce the prevalence 
of risk behaviors during evacuations. Here, we analyzed 126 videos of 
evacuations from real-world emergency incidents to examine which 
communication strategies reduce risk behaviors. We found evidence of 
three types of evacuation behaviors (delayed response, filming, running) 
and four emergency communication strategies (evacuation alarm, staff 
guiding people to exits, general prerecorded message, live announce-
ment). Our findings suggest that the most effective emergency 
communication strategy—for reducing risk behaviors such as a delayed 
response, filming, and running—was having staff guide people to exits, 
while the least effective communication is the sounding of an alarm by 
itself. Additionally, evacuation alarms and prerecorded messages 
increased the likelihood of filming behavior but staff guidance and live 
announcements did not. The presence of an evacuation alarm, live 
announcement, general prerecorded message, or staff guidance were all 
associated with less running during evacuations. Communication stra-
tegies were often implemented together. When considering the inde-
pendent contribution of communication strategies and taking the 
situational context into account, the presence of a perceivable threat was 
Table 2 
Frequency of risk behaviors when emergency communications are not present vs. present.  
Emergency communication or contextual variable 
(perceivable threat) 
Risk behavior when emergency 
communication not present 
Risk behavior when emergency 




Delayed response     
Evacuation alarm* 28.2% 48.8% 2.42* 0.20 
General prerecorded message 34.9% 35.0% 1.00  
Staff guidance* 41.9% 20.0% 0.35* 0.21 
Live announcement 35.7% 28.6% 0.72  
Perceivable threat* 47.2% 26.0% 0.39* 0.22 
Filming     
Evacuation alarm*** 44.7% 78.0% 4.40*** 0.31 
General prerecorded message* 50.9% 80.0% 3.85* 0.21 
Staff guidance 58.1% 50.0% 0.72  
Live announcement 55.4% 57.1% 1.08  
Perceivable threat* 67.9% 46.6% 0.41* 0.21 
Running     
Evacuation alarm*** 64.7% 12.2% 0.08*** 0.49 
General prerecorded message*** 54.7% 10.0% 0.09*** 0.33 
Staff guidance* 54.7% 32.5% 0.40* 0.21 
Live announcement* 50.9% 21.4% 0.26* 0.19 
Perceivable threat*** 15% 71.0% 13.93*** 0.56 
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
Table 3 
Logistic regression models predicting risk behaviors during evacuations.   







alarm    
Odds ratio 1.89 3.43* 0.17* 
(95% CI) (0.64–5.67) (1.28–9.21) (0.04-0.65) 
p 0.25 0.04 0.01 
General prerecorded message 
Odds ratio 0.43 1.75 0.73 
(95% CI) (0.12–1.57) (0.43–7.07) (0.11–4.71) 
p 0.20 0.43 0.74 
Staff guidance    
Odds ratio 0.33* 0.65 0.37 
(95% CI) (0.12-0.90) (0.27–1.57) (0.13–1.03) 
p 0.03 0.34 0.06 
Live 
announcement    
Odds ratio 1.01 1.39 0.43 
(95% CI) (0.24–4.24) (0.39–4.97) (0.09–2.11) 
p 0.99 0.61 0.30 
Perceivable 
threat    
Odds ratio 0.39 0.78 6.3** 
(95% CI) (0.15–1.02) (0.31–1.93) (2.22–17.87) 
p 0.06 0.59 <0.01     
Cox & Snell R2 0.117 0.109 0.310 
Nagelkerke R2 0.16 0.15 0.41 
Note. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05. The odds ratios are presented with their 
95% confidence intervals, meaning there is a 0.95 probability that the odds ratio 
will lie within this interval. 
1 Although we flagged videos in which filming occurred while stopping or 
moving against the recommended evacuation direction, we noted that filming 
typically did not appear to be a hindrance to others in the videos. We found no 
instances in which the person filming was blocking an exit. Even when many 
people were filming a performance on a stage that then caught fire (see video of 
the opening of the King Kong movie), it did not seem to prevent others from 
evacuating. 
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associated with more running, but filming and delayed responses less 
likely. 
To prevent delayed responses, staff guiding people to exits is the 
most effective communication. The sounding of an evacuation alarm by 
itself is the most ineffective communication, increasing the likelihood of 
delayed responses. These results correspond with our secondary analysis 
of Lovreglio et al.’s (2019) study, showing that for all drills and fire 
incidents the average response times for a voice alarm or prerecorded 
voice message were faster than for an alarm only or no alarm at all. The 
results also align with other findings that an alarm sounding is not al-
ways recognized to be indicating an incident (Proulx & Sime, 1991; 
Proulx, 2001) and people respond faster when there are staff guiding 
them to exits (Shields & Boyce, 2000). 
None of the four emergency communications were observed to be 
effective at reducing filming behavior. Specifically, staff guidance and 
live announcements did not have a significant relationship with filming. 
Evacuation alarms and prerecorded messages actually were associated 
with significantly more filming behavior than no communication. 
However, taking the situational context and other communication 
strategies into account, the presence of a perceivable threat did decrease 
the likelihood of filming behavior. These results resonate with reported 
experiences from safety practitioners who indicated that filming is 
difficult to prevent and might be out of curiosity (Van der Wal, 2019). 
Possibly, filming is more likely when cues are unclear, as may be the case 
when evacuation alarms sound or general messages are given without 
specific information. To prevent running while evacuating, all four 
communications seem to be effective, however, suggesting that crowd 
professionals should choose whichever approach best integrates with 
their overall emergency communication strategy. 
5. Strengths and limitations 
We believe that a key strength of our research is the use of video 
recordings of actual behavior in real emergency incidents. Previous 
research has relied on field experiments, often by systematically varying 
communication strategies and contextual cues during emergency drills. 
Although emergency drills may have reasonable ecological validity 
compared to laboratory experiments, people’s behavior may still differ 
in response time or other risky behaviors from real-world emergency 
evacuations where there is danger and threat to life. (Robinson, 2016) 
Other previous research relies on self-reports. However, while self- 
reports can identify invisible cognitive processes, they are prone to 
recall accuracy which may bias findings. For instance, recall of situa-
tions can be biased by emotions and post-event information (Kaplan 
et al., 2016; Schacter & Loftus, 2013). More objective and accurate 
analysis of actual emergency behavior unfolding in real-time in videos of 
incidents can therefore substantially enhance our understanding. We 
believe that our video analysis complements the method of analyzing 
self-reports from survivors and evacuees, as part of an effective mixed- 
method strategy. 
Another strength of our research is that it provides empirical evi-
dence for a link between emergency communication and evacuation 
behaviors. First, we have identified which communications are most 
effective at facilitating faster responses and safer evacuations, and in 
which emergency circumstances, as we have discussed above with 
accompanying recommendations. Second, we hope that this research 
also stimulates further research into this important area by other re-
searchers, by providing both findings on which to build and also a 
methodological protocol for studying such communication and behav-
iors in actual emergency incidents. 
Our research has three main limitations. First, we could only analyze 
events for which videos existed and were identified in our search, so the 
sample of videos was not necessarily representative of the full range of 
real-world emergencies. Material may not have been uploaded to the 
public domain where it contained sensitive footage and where people 
have experienced the pressure to not film. Second, the videos may not 
have captured all people who experienced the event, or the full timeline 
of the event, with relevant behaviors potentially occurring off-camera. 
Third, as this was correlational research, we were unable to experi-
ment systematically with the absence or presence of a communication 
strategy to examine its causal effects. 
5.1. Implications and future research 
The main practical recommendation arising from our findings is to 
supplement traditional emergency alarms with guidance from staff, 
either as additional verbal announcements or better still with guidance 
in person, to improve response times. While pre-recorded messages can 
help here, they run the risk of being misperceived as a false alarm or drill 
in the same way that regular alarms do. For these reasons, communi-
cation from humans that is clearly tailored to that specific situation and 
occurring in real-time is much more likely to facilitate faster evacuation. 
A further practical recommendation is to improve public awareness 
of the danger of such risk behaviors in emergencies and encourage faster 
response times. A public awareness campaign could encourage people 
not to film and to evacuate quickly in emergencies, for instance. 
Finally, our findings also have theoretical and methodological im-
plications for future research. We have demonstrated that videos of real- 
world incidents can be systematically analyzed to examine the effec-
tiveness of communication strategies. Future research could use video 
evidence to further assess the prevalence of delayed response, running, 
and filming in response to different communication strategies. It could 
also be used to examine correlations between response time and 
delaying behaviors, or between filming and congestion. Cultural factors 
can also play a role, for example in response times, which can be studied 
in future work (Galea et al., 2011). Our main research question here 
asked whether the risk behaviors occured, so future research can look at 
how many times they occur. 
6. Conclusions 
Our findings suggest that authorities should focus on staff interven-
tion during incidents to reduce delayed evacuation responses and that 
any type of emergency communication shows promise for reducing 
running. Furthermore, we believe that more videos should be made 
available to researchers and safety practitioners to develop this prom-
ising methodological approach further. From these videos, we can learn 
which emergency communications occur, how frequently, and in which 
circumstances, and examine the responses to these factors. Such an 
approach will enable us to find solutions to prevent risk behaviors in 
evacuation and choose effective emergency communication strategies, 
which will ultimately prevent injuries and save lives. 
Table 4 
Frequency of risk behaviors.  






44 The majority (>50%) of visible 
people delay moving in the 
most efficient way towards the 
exit (due to congestion, 
collecting belongings, waiting 
for another person, or a slow 
response >30 seconds). 
Delayed response – 
quantitative* 
32 (out of subset of 78 
videos with observable 
response times) 
The majority (>50%) of visible 
people have a slow response 
(≥30 seconds) to the incident 
before starting evacuation. 
*Delayed response was analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively, as 
described in the Methods section (Gwynne & Boyce, 2016; Purser & Bensilum, 
2001) 
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Appendix 
Here we present the results of the delayed response (quantitative) 
variable. Based on previous research and different ways to measure 
response times, we analyzed the response times quantitatively in com-
bination with a qualitative layer as mentioned in the main text (Gwynne 
& Boyce, 2016; Purser & Bensilum, 2001). For completeness, we also 
include the results for the purely quantitative variable in this appendix. 
Results: Delayed response (quantitative) 
The distribution of response times in the emergency videos reviewed 
are shown in Fig. 1, for 78 of the 126 videos it was possible to classify 
(Table 4). The distributions for the majority of observed people are 
shown. Statistical analyses were performed for the dichotomized 
response time, where a response time of 30 s or more indicates a delayed 
response. The Chi-square tests show that this risk behavior is more likely 
when the evacuation alarm is present, but not more or less likely when 
staff guidance, a general prerecorded message, or a live announcement 
were present (Table 5). Taking the context into account, this risk 
behavior was less likely when a perceivable threat was present (Table 5). 
The logistic regression shows that this risk behavior was not more or less 
likely when the communication strategies were present or when taking 
the context into account (Table 6). 
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